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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of
this title, the district courts, together
with the United States District Court for the
District of the Canal Zone and the District
Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States, for money
damages, accruing on and after January 1,
1945, for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting
within the scope of his office or employment,
under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C.S. § 2680(h)
The provisions of this chapter [28 USCS §§
2671 et seq.] and section 1346(b) of this
title shall not apply to (h) Any claim arising out of assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,

malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or
interference with contract rights: . . .
Idaho Code § 6-903(a) (1990)
Except as otherwise provided in this act,
every governmental entity is subject to
liability for money damages arising out of
its negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or
omissions and those of its employees acting
within the course and scope of their
employment or duties, whether arising out of
a governmental or proprietary function, where
the governmental entity if a private person
or entity would be liable for money damages
under the laws of the state of Idaho,
provided that the governmental entity is
subject to liability only for the pro rata
share of the total damages awarded in favor
of a claimant which is attributable to the
negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or
omissions of the governmental entity or its
employees.
Idaho Code § 6-904(3) (1990)
A governmental entity and its employees while
acting within the course and scope of their
employment and without malice or criminal
intent shall not be liable for any claim
which:
3. Arises out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or
interference with contract rights.
New Mexico Statutes Ann. § 41-4-12 (Mitchie 1989)
The immunity granted pursuant to Subsection A
of Section 41-4-4 NMSA 1978 does not apply to
liability for personal injury, bodily injury,
wrongful death of property damage resulting
from assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of
process, libel, slander, defamation of
character, violation of property rights or
deprivation of any rights, privileges or
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immunities secured by the constitution and
laws of the United States or New Mexico when
caused by law enforcement officers while
acting within the scope of their duties.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff concedes that the action in question was a
governmental function, and that he claims immunity was waived by
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1990).

Plaintiff admits that the

injuries in question arose from an assault and battery. Mr.
Petersen then seeks to avoid the applicable exception to waiver
of immunity by claiming that allegations of negligent hiring,
supervision, and retention of a government employee are not
subject to the exceptions to waiver of immunity as are all other
negligence claims.
All claims of negligence by a governmental employee against
a governmental entity are subject to the exceptions to waiver of
immunity found in the statute. A claim of negligent hiring and
supervision is no different from any other negligence action.
Plaintiff's reliance on Idaho and Federal law is misplaced.
Both the Idaho and Federal Tort Claims Acts include waivers of
immunity for negligence and all other wrongful acts.

Unlike

Utah, these statutes waived immunity for intentional torts. Both
the Idaho and Federal Tort Claims Acts then contain exceptions to
their general waivers of immunity, including an exception for
claims arising out of assault and battery.
Utah's exception for injuries arising out of assault and
battery is inherently different.

Because Utah did not waive

immunity for intentional torts, this exception could not
3

reasonably be interpreted as merely retaining immunity for such
torts.

The exception can only be reasonably interpreted as

retaining immunity for the negligent acts of governmental
employees that proximately cause another to suffer injury arising
out of an assault and battery.
Given this clear retention of immunity for injuries arising
out of assault and battery, the trial court erred when it denied
the Board of Education's motion to dismiss.
ARGUMENT
I. ALL OF THE PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS OF
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE BOARD OF
EDUCATION OF THE DAVIS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
ARE SUBJECT TO THE RETENTION OF IMMUNITY FOR
INJURIES ARISING OUT OF ASSAULT AND BATTERY
In his appellee's brief, Mr. Petersen expressly concedes
that the challenged conduct of the Board of Education of Davis
County School District is clearly a governmental function.
Appellee's Brief at page 6.
As to the second step, of determining whether there has been
a waiver of immunity, the plaintiff relies upon the waiver of
immunity for the negligent acts or omissions of government
employees found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1990).
The final step is to determine whether there are any
applicable exceptions to the specific waiver of immunity.

But

having reached this point, plaintiff then claims that the
exceptions to said waiver, found in the same statute, are somehow
not applicable to his claims.
But the waiver of immunity for the negligence of a

4

government employee is subject to numerous exceptions.

One of

those exceptions retains the Board of Education's immunity for
the negligence of its employees "if the injury arises out of:
assault, battery."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1990).

Plaintiff, without benefit of any statutory authority,
claims that allegations of negligent hiring, retention, or
supervision of a governmental employee are not subject to the
exceptions to waiver of immunity as are all other negligence
claims.

Mr. Petersen relies upon this Court's decision in

Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989) for this
proposition.
Birkner involved negligence actions against an employee of
the county, and against the county.

The negligence alleged

against the county was its claimed failure to properly supervise
its employee.

This Court held that the county could be found

liable for negligent hiring and supervision of an employee.
explaining its decision, this Court stated:
Section 63-30-10 permits an action against
the state and its political subdivisions for
negligent acts or omissions of employees
committed within the scope of employment,
with some exceptions not relevant here.
771 P.2d at 1059, emphasis added, footnote omitted.
footnote to this statement the Court stated:
Section 63-30-10(1) provides that "immunity
from suit of all governmental entities is
waived for injury proximately caused by a
negligent act or omission of an employee
committed within the scope of employment"
unless certain specified exceptions are
applicable.
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In a

In

771 P.2d at 1059, n. 4.

The injuries at question in Birkner did

not arise from an assault or battery.

They did not arise out

incarceration, the issuance of a license, false arrest, false
imprisonment, or any of the other specified exceptions to waiver
of immunity found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1990).

For that

reason, the county in Birkner could be held liable for its
negligent hiring and supervision of an employee.
But Mr. Petersen's injuries in the present action are
affirmatively pled to have been caused by an assault and battery.
Because this is so, the specified exception for injuries arising
out of assault and battery applies and the immunity of the Board
of Education has not been waived.
Plaintiff seems to argue that the retention of immunity for
injuries arising out of assault and battery should be construed
so as to apply only to retention of immunity from allegations of
assault and battery.
Plaintiff's interpretation of the statute would make Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1990) meaningless.

Almost all of the

torts listed in this section are intentional torts, such as
assault and battery.
The Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, et
seq., does not contain a waiver of immunity for intentional torts
(such as assault and battery) committed by government employees.
Alema Teo has been named as a party to this action and recovery
can be had from him if he is found to have performed the
intentional torts of assault and battery.
6

Because section 10 of the Governmental Immunity Act only
deals with negligent acts and omissions, there would be no need
for it to retain immunity for intentional torts. Mr. Petersen
asks this Court to interpret subsection 2 to be an exception to
waiver of immunity for which there had been no waiver of immunity
in the first place.

This is contrary to the Court's "fundamental

duty to give effect, if possible, to every word of the statute."
Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 252, n. 11 (Utah 1988).
Instead, the meaning of the statute is clear.

Utah Code

Ann. § 63-30-10 waives immunity for injuries proximately caused
by the negligent acts or omissions of government employees.
this waiver is not absolute.
are listed in the statute.

But

Numerous exceptions to this waiver

The salient question is out of what

act the complained of injuries arose, not what the particular
negligence of the government employee may be.
The particular act of negligence that a plaintiff may allege
is not determinative of whether or not governmental immunity has
been waived.

The Court must look instead out of what action the

claimed injury arises.

If the injury arises out of one of the

specific exceptions, then immunity has been retained.
That is how this Court interpreted the statute in question
in Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 740 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987).
Maddocks held that the retention of immunity for injuries arising
out of assault and battery applied to the plaintiff's claim that
three city employees had negligently failed to intervene and
protect the plaintiff from the assault and battery committed by
7

their fellow employee.
Plaintiff's phrasing of the claim against
Salt Lake City as one for negligence does not
bring it within the category of claims for
which immunity is waived.
Id. at 1340. The instant action cannot be distinguished from
Maddocks.

All of the injuries claimed by Petersen arise out of

the alleged assault and battery.

For this reason the Board of

Education's immunity has not been waived regardless of the
particular negligence plaintiff might allege.
Plaintiff seeks to distinguish this Court's decision in
Connell v. Tooele City. 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977), as well as the
other Utah cases cited by the Board of Education, on the basis
that they do not involve claims of negligent hiring, training,
retaining, or supervising of government employees.
Defendant Board of Education is at a loss to understand how
these negligence claims differ from any and all other claims of
negligence.
distinction.

Certainly the statutes of Utah do not make such a
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1990), applies to all

claims of negligence, including those raised in the instant
action.
Plaintiff also asks this Court to judicially amend the
Governmental Immunity Act so as to waive immunity in the instant
case as a matter of public policy.1

Mr. Petersen has not, at any

time, challenged the constitutionality of the Governmental
1

In support of this effort, plaintiff relies upon three press
clippings concerning school aged children that were never submitted
to the trial court, are not part of the record, and are irrelevant
and immaterial.
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Immunity Act.

He simply urges the Court to interpret contrary to

its unambiguous language because he claims that the act, as
enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah, is not sound
public policy.
While this Court has complete authority to interpret the
laws enacted by the legislature, and total authority to determine
whether such laws are constitutional, it is not this Court's
function to pass on the propriety, correctness, or soundness of
the laws passed by the legislature.
It is not the function of this Court to
evaluate the wisdom or practical necessity of
legislative enactments. It is the power and
responsibility of the Legislature to enact
laws to promote the public health, safety,
morals and general welfare of society, and
this Court will not substitute our judgment
for that of the Legislature with respect to
what best serves the public interest. The
adjustment and accommodation of conflicting
interests, such as are involved in this case,
are for the Legislature to resolve,
irrespective of the rules applied by other
states.
Bastian v. King. 661 P.2d 953, 956 (Utah 1983) (citations
omitted); see also. Ketchum. Konkel. et al. v. Heritage Mt.. 784
P.2d 1217, 1223-24 (Utah App. 1989).
Plaintiff's claimed injuries all arose out of the alleged
assault and battery committed by Alema Teo.

The Utah State

Legislature has determined that sovereign immunity should not be
waived for injuries arising out of assaults and batteries.

For

this reason, the Board of Education is entitled to governmental
immunity and the trial court erred in not granting the Board's
motion to dismiss.
9

II. FEDERAL, IDAHO, AND NEW MEXICO STATUTES
ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ARE NOT IDENTICAL TO
THOSE OF UTAH AND THE CASE LAW OF THESE
JURISDICTIONS IS NOT USEFUL IN INTERPRETING
THE MEANING OF UTAH'S STATUTE
Plaintiff relies on case law from the state of New Mexico
and Idaho, and upon federal case law.

Plaintiff incorrectly

claims that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act was patterned
after the Federal Tort Claims Act. While parts of the Utah law
are similar to parts of the Federal act, the entire structure of
the two laws is different.
While this Court has looked to federal precedent in
determining how to interpret the phrase "discretionary function,f!
Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Services. 667 P.2d 49 (Utah
1983), a brief review of the two acts makes it clear that they
are not identical, or even very similar.

Even assuming that Utah

borrowed from the Federal Tort Claims Act, the material changes
that Utah has made to the act, and the different setting it has
given to its provisions, indicate that federal judicial
interpretations of the federal act are not applicable to the Utah
act.

The same can be said for New Mexico and Idaho.
In Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903

(Utah 1984), this Court explained:
We recognize that when the Legislature adopts
a statute from another state, the presumption
is that the Legislature is familiar with that
state's judicial interpretations of that
statute and intends to adopt them also.
However, that canon of statutory construction
is not a hard and fast principle; it is
subject to a number of exceptions, several of
which are directly applicable in the instant
case. In the first place, it is not
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applicable where there have been material
changes made in the second statute.
Secondly, the above-stated rule of statutory
construction is subject to the exception that
if the borrowed statute is "given a different
setting in the adopting state" the
construction placed upon the statute in the
originating state need not be followed.
679 P.2d at 904-5 (citations omitted).

A review of the immunity

statutes at question in the cases cited by the plaintiff quickly
demonstrates that those foreign statutes are not similar, let
alone identical, to the applicable statutes of Utah.
The New Mexico statute being considered in Ortiz v. New
Mexico State Police, 814 P.2d 117 (N.M.App. 1991) did not retain
immunity for assault and battery.

New Mexico Statutes Ann. § 41-

4-12 (Mitchie 1989) expressly waives immunity for injuries
resulting from an assault or battery caused by New Mexico law
enforcement officers.
Both the Idaho and Federal Tort Claims Acts contain general
waivers of immunity not only for negligent acts of their
employees, but also for any other wrongful acts.

Under Idaho and

Federal law, the government is liable to the same extent a
private person would be.

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), and Idaho Code §

6-903(a) (1990).
To the contrary,

Utah's laws retain immunity generally.

Utah then provides certain limited waivers of immunity, including
a partial waiver of immunity for the negligent acts or omissions
of government employees.
Having waived immunity generally, the Idaho and Federal
statutes then provide an exception to that waiver for intentional
11

torts, such as assault and battery.

28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), and

Idaho Code § 6-904(3).
Utah's statutes do not waive sovereign immunity for
intentional torts or other wrongful acts, as do the Idaho and
Federal laws.

Instead, Utah's waiver of immunity for injury

proximately caused by an employee's negligence provides for an
exception to that waiver if the injury arises out of an assault
and battery.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (1990).

The material differences between the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act are further
demonstrated by the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Sheridan v. U.S. . 487 U.S. 392, 108 S.Ct. 2449 (1989).

Sheridan

held that the federal retention of immunity for claims arising
out of assault and battery only provides immunity against claims
for the intentional torts of government employees.

The Court

held that the United States was not immune from claims of
independent negligence by other government employees even when
the injury arose from the assault and battery committed by a
government employee.
If Utah were to adopt the federal interpretation of the
Federal Torts Claim Act, the Utah statutory provision in question
would become a nullity.

Utah has never waived its immunity from

suit for intentional torts, as the United States did.

Section

63-30-10 only speaks to negligence actions.
In Grant v. City of Twin Falls. 120 Idaho 69, 813 P.2d 880
(Idaho 1991), the Supreme Court of Idaho explained the operation
12

of the Idaho Tort Claims Act.
The Act is structured in three tiers: The
general rule is that governmental entities
are liable for damages arising out of their
own negligent or otherwise wrongful acts and
for those of their employees who were acting
within the course and scope of their
employment. Section 6-904 then sets out
certain exceptions to liability, including,
relevant to the present discussion, an
exception for acts such as battery and false
imprisonment commonly known as intentional
torts.
120 Idaho at 76-77.

Unlike Utah, Idaho's exception applies only

to the intentional torts themselves and is not part of a statute
dealing with the waiver of immunity for negligence, and
exceptions thereto.
If the retention of immunity for injuries arising out of
assault and battery is to have any meaning, it must mean that
government entities cannot be sued for the negligence of their
employees that proximately causes another to suffer an injury
arising out of an assault or battery.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in denying the Board of Education of
Davis County School District's motion to dismiss.

The Board is

entitled to governmental immunity because the challenged injury
arises out of assault and battery, for which immunity has been
retained.

For these reasons Defendant-Appellant Board of

Education asks this Court to reverse the trial court and order
this action dismissed with prejudice as it relates to this
Defendant.
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